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Industrial Deconcentration and Legal Feasibility:
The Efficiencies Defense
Joseph F. Brodley

The objective of the industrial reorganization bill embodies an ancient and deeply held American value, confinement of discretionary

power. In the post-Watergate era there is a resurgence of that ideal,
which perhaps may encompass not only governmental power but also

the institutions of private economic power. Blocking this path there lies
a formidable intellectual barrier: the fear that deconcentration can be

accomplished only at grave cost to our productive efficiency. In times of

economic recession, perhaps in any times, this seems too high a price to
pay. The issue this poses for the industrial reorganization bill is whether
it is possible to devise an effective piece of judicial machinery that will

stop short of destroying productive efficiencies and yet will go far
enough to achieve significant deconcentration. The subject of this article
is an attempted answer to that question. I begin with a brief inquiry into
what we mean by legal feasibility.
The Nature of Legal Feasibility

There are severe limits upon what can be managed effectively in a
courtroom or before an administrative agency. It is much less than what
The author is Professor of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington. This article

was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Evolutionary
Economics, San Francisco, California, 27-29 December 1974. The article bene-

fited greatly from the skillful research of Ronald Oakes, a third year student at
Indiana University School of Law, particularly as concerns the Public Utility
Holding Company Act.
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can be handled in a scholarly inquiry or a closed door study by a panel
of experts. Most essentially, this is because the effect of the legal process
on a contested factual inquiry is similar to the application of a magnifying glass of high focal power. Issues spring up where they seem not to
have existed; simple questions are transformed into matters of high complexity; and that which begins as complex is apt to become wholly unmanageable. All of this takes place in a verbal battle, one level removed
from the facts under examination. The flavor was captured thirty years
ago by Walton Hamilton and Irene Till in their description of an antitrust proceeding:
Every move, every witness, every fact, every document becomes a
counter in a legal game. "The record" has come to do vicarious
duty for an analysis of the industry in operation; and every item,
favorable to one side, can win admission only against the heavy
cross-fire of the other. Every procedural device which may arrest
or speed action, flank or snipe the verbal minions of the enemy,
color the conduct on parade with innocence or guilt, is called into
play. The campaign is lost in its events.'

The problem is inescapable because the primary standard of procedural

justice in a contested legal proceeding is not the efficiency of the procedures but the protection of the rights of litigants. Short of drastically
truncating those rights, the only solution is to carefully shape the issues
submitted to litigation such that they emerge in clearly articulated, simplified form.

This principle can be seen clearly at work in antitrust law. The success of that law is virtually coextensive with the operation of its simplified, per se rules, such as the rules against price fixing, division of the
market between competitors, and horizontal mergers. Where complex
rules have been employed, such as the Rule of Reason and in the rules
governing remedial aspects of monopolization cases in the last thirty
years, the result has been dismal failure.

Reducing Decisional Complexity

Since it will be my conclusion that it is not feasible to eliminate entirely from a deconcentration proceeding the highly complex issue of an
efficiencies defense, I am concerned that there are additional complexities that may engulf the proceedings. As matters now stand there are at
least seven complex issues to be resolved in a reorganization proceeding,
which is roughly five too many. The result is likely to be the draining of
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vital energies from the crucial issue of efficiencies, resolution of which
will control effective implementation of the act.

While outside the scope of my article, I tentatively will indicate how
these other decisional complexities might be reduced. First, in place of
the present three-part test, a single test for monopoly power should be
substituted: whether four or less firms account for 50 percent or more of

sales. This would delete the two more elusive alternative tests based on
high profits and absence of substantial price competition. Second, the
new single test would be conclusive rather than merely presumptive of
monopoly power. This removes a potentially troublesome Sherman Act
inquiry as to whether the four or less firms identified as holding 50 percent or more of the market do in fact possess "monopoly power." Third,

administration of the patent defense should be shaped to prevent submersion of the proceedings in a bog of patent invalidity and patent
misuse claims. One approach to this defense, which permits monopoly
power to be retained if resting solely on valid patents not misused,
might be to assume the validity of any patents not previously declared
invalid and to require the patent misuse to be flagrant.
The Efficiencies Defense
The Lessons of the Past

The draftsmen of the industrial reorganization bill did not attempt to
write on a clean slate. In providing for the defense of loss of substantial
economies they engrafted the concept and the very language of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. Moreover, the issue of loss of
economies also has arisen from time to time under the antitrust laws.
What lessons does this past history have to teach us?
PROTECTION OF CREDITORS AND INVESTORS. Divestiture under the
Public Utility Holding Company Act required the reorganization of literally billions of dollars of assets in the form of notes, debentures (secured
and unsecured), preferred stock, common stock (voting and nonvoting),
and warrants, held at various levels of multitiered holding company
structures. The complexity staggered the imagination. In the case of
secured instruments the very properties upon which the securities rested
often had to be divided. Yet the Securities and Exchange Commission, which was charged with administering the act, was able to preserve
the relative value of the various securities to a remarkable degree.2 The
SEC was given substantially the full discretionary powers of a court of
equity, and at least under these circumstances the lesson from the past is
one of striking success.
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VIABILITY OF DIVESTED PARTS. That assets or companies divested

shall be able to survive as going concerns is, of course, a minimal
condition for divestiture feasibility. So far as I have been able to discover, this condition has been met in divestments under the Public
Utility Holding Company Act. Indeed, the commission several times

denied divestiture when it had serious doubts as to the ability of the
isolated system to survive. Surprisingly, in divestitures under the anti-

trust laws the separated parts often have failed. This has occurred in
instances where there has been a sale of assets or companies to outsiders. An example under Section 2 of the Sherman Act was the courtdecreed sale by the old glucose monopoly of plants which were soon

thereafter in bankruptcy.3 Similar results have been encountered in

Section 7 merger relief, where two recent studies have shown a truly
remarkable degree of failures in viability.4
Fortunately, the solution to the problem seems to be largely a matter

of corporate mechanics. When particular assets or companies are required to be disposed of to outsiders, the original corporation and its

management have no continuing interest in the success of the disgorged
parts. Indeed, they have an opposite incentive; they wish to retain as
much as they can of what is valuable and to ensure that the divested
parts do not compete with excessive vigor.
On the other hand, if the corporate mechanics are handled so as to
give the old shareholders and their officers a continuing interest in the

success of the divested assets, the incentives change, and the problem is

avoided. This can be done through a distribution of ownership shares in
the divested assets to the existing shareholders pro rata in exchange for

their old shares. The desired incentive is strengthened, and the problem
of continuing control eliminated, if officers, directors, and large share-

holders are permitted to hold shares in only one of the new companies,
the precise company to be selected by lottery after distribution.5
SUBSTANTIAL EFFICIENCIES UNDER THE UTILITIES HOLDING COM-

PANY ACT. The standard of loss of substantial efficiencies was written
into the very language of the Public Utilities Holding Company Act. It
was crucial to the passage of the act, a key compromise between those
who wished to pursue divestiture at whatever cost and those who sought
to modify the impact of the law by making divestiture a matter of ad-

ministrative discretion.6 As passed, the act provided that a public utility
holding company would be limited to a single integrated system except

in those cases where an additional system could not be operated inde-

pendently "without the loss of substantial economies."7
The issue frequently was litigated as holding companies made repeated attempts to justify retention of one or more additional systems. A
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study of this litigation provides less guidance than one might anticipate
for an effective, even handed application of an economies defense. To

some extent the statement seems justified that the SEC circumvented the
defense.

To begin with, the SEC often was able to bypass the issue of econo-

mies by deciding the case on an alternative basis. This was because, unlike the provision in the proposed deconcentration statute, loss of substantial economies was not in itself sufficient to save a system from

divestiture; two other conditions also had to be satisfied: geographic
contiguity and preservation of the benefits of local management.8 If either of these conditions were not met, the economies issue could be, and
frequently was, avoided as unnecessary to decision.

Nevertheless, my research assistant, who spent over 100 hours studying the Utility Act decisions, discovered no less than 22 cases in which
the economies issue was resolved, although the depth and degree of the

analysis varied greatly. Indeed, these decisions reveal that, from the beginning, the SEC adopted a very restrictive view of the economies de-

fense. Defendants were required to prove the existence of substantial

economies, not by the usual preponderance of the evidence, but by clear
and convincing evidence.9 Applying this stringent standard, the SEC developed a series of hurdles which, despite growing sophistication on the

part of defendants, proved impossible to surmount except in one very
narrow class of cases (discussed below).
In rejecting proferred showings of economies, the SEC offered five
reasons, which the courts generally sustained. First, the general quality

of the evidence was defective, as based on incomplete data, or not
based on the estimates of unbiased observers, or not sufficiently quan-

tified.10 Second, some particular error in the evidence was discovered,
for which reason the entire offering must be rejected (rather than revised
to correct the error). A striking example of this occurred in the New

England Electric case, where an entire cost estimate by an independent

consulting firm was rejected due to a single error."1 Third, the economies
were found not to be of the kind protected by the statute, such as loss of
ability by the principal system to borrow cheaply from the subsidiary.12
Fourth, the economies were not operational economies, such as financial
know-how (which could be learned), or tax advantages (which were

deemed fortuitous and a function of the changing state of the tax law).13
Finally, in the case of combination gas and electric companies, any

economies, including convenience to consumers in joint operation, were
outweighed by the (unqualified) benefits of competition.14

The net result of all this, not surprisingly, was that in scarcely any
instance was the economies defense sustained. The only exceptions oc-
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curred in a few cases involving very small companies, where the SEC
was persuaded that the additional system would not be able to survive

as a separate unit.15 In other situations, whatever the showing of
economies, the loss was inevitably deemed not "substantial." This result
was reached out of hand when the magnitude of the economies amount-

ed to 3 percent or less of operating costs. But the economies defense
was also rejected in cases, relatively few, where increased operating expenses of 7, 9, and even 21 percent were projected, with diminutions in
net income of 30 percent or more.'6

Despite the persistently negative ultimate findings, the decisions reveal that there were some economies which the SEC was willing to take
more seriously than others. This permits a brief summary to be made of

the kinds of proof of economies that stood the best chance of success
before the SEC. A strong economies case would (1) rest on the separate

findings of two or more teams of independent experts, (2) rely on
economies of joint usage of personnel and property, (3) emphasize operations closely coordinated by a centralized management, (4) utilize oper-

ating expense projections made on almost every conceivable assumption,
and (5) weigh such projections pessimistically as to the results of continued joint operation and optimistically as to the benefits of separate operation.

Administration of the Public Utility Holding Company Act may be

instructive in several ways, but one insight it suggests is that an effective
means of dealing with an issue of high complexity, here the economies

defense, is to all but read it out of the statute. Indeed, the very same
tactic seems to have been followed by the Federal Trade Commission in
its administration of the cost justification defense to the Robinson-Patman price discrimination law.17
EFFICIENCIES IN ANTITRUST CASES. The treatment of efficiencies in

antitrust cases has, if anything, been even more cavalier. Occasionally
the issue has been raised that a merger be allowed (or, more surprisingly, disallowed) because it would promote efficiencies. But the usual disposition has been that efficiencies are not relevant.'8

The issue also arises in Section 2 monopoly cases, particularly on the
question of relief. Thus, in Second Alcoa Judge Knox declines to order

divestiture of Alcoa in part because of the possibility of a "marked loss

of efficiency."'19 But other than the finding that there was only one properly located alumina plant, his conclusions are more assumed than
proved. In the United Shoe decision, the impracticability of dividing a

single manufacturing plant, including its single research facility, again
serves as a key reason for denying divestiture relief.2" The court men-

This content downloaded from 156.56.168.2 on Tue, 24 May 2016 18:40:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

The Efficiencies Defense 371

tions, but does not analyze, the underlying problem of allocating managerial and labor personnel between newly created plants.
The United Shoe decision is more instructive in its consideration of
the defendant's claim to research superiority. This type of efficiency was
not raised, so far as I can ascertain, in the decisions under the Public

Utility Holding Company Act. But it seems bound to become a major
line of defense under the industrial reorganization bill. The defendant in
United Shoe offered evidence which the court accepted as "fully qualified, disinterested and able" that United simply had no equal in the development of machines involving "complex motions in small space."
And the court itself characterized United's research organization as hav-

ing demonstrated "efficiency, intelligence and vision." Nevertheless, the
claim to superior efficiency was rejected because the rate of improvement of old machines and invention of new ones did not appear to the

court, or to United's chief competitor, whose testimony the court cites,
as creating a "formidable record" or justifying "special encomia."'21 Perhaps inevitably, the decision appears subjective. This may explain the
court's unwillingness to countenance division of the research facility. It
also reveals the difficulty of litigating an issue of dynamic efficiency.
WERE EFFICIENCIES IN FACT LoST? Notwithstanding the lack of development of feasible legal rules by which to handle determination of ef-

ficiencies, it is pertinent to ask whether in fact divestiture has been carried out without loss of serious efficiencies. Such evidence as is available
would suggest that no serious efficiency loss has occurred. In the case of

the public utility holding company divestitures, it has even been suggested that the breaking up of the holding companies was a positive force
for economic health, a "death sentence" only for "a disembodied legal

fiction . . . a new lease on life for the . . . investor."22 Nor are any serious efficiency losses to be detected in terms of loss of investment values
in early Section 2 Sherman Act divestitures such as the Standard Oil,
Tobacco, or Powder Trust divestitures,23 or in a series of more recent
antitrust spin-offs.24

The lesson that can be drawn from this is limited. Divestitures under

the Public Utility Holding Company Act followed the exposure of widespread management abuse and were themselves a visible demonstration
that needed reforms were being accomplished, helping to restore investor confidence. Moreover, the securities market placed a discount on the
indirect ownership of operating companies, which divorcement re-

moved.25 Finally, to the extent any inefficiencies were introduced by the
breakups, these were ameliorated by the fact that the operating compa-

nies were regulated monopolies, utilizing a cost plus method of pricing at
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a time when the efficiency of the whole technology of power generation
was rising.

As for the Sherman Act cases, the divestitures under Section 2 typically did no more than replace single firm monopoly with highly concentrated oligopoly; hence these cases really do not approach the issue
under the Hart bill. Spin-off of a previously independent company, illegally acquired, similarly fails to answer the question which the division
of going concerns would raise.

The short of the matter is that the past history of proceedings under
the Public Utility Holding Company Act and under the antitrust laws
supplies scant illumination for the path to a feasible economies defense.
Economic Tests for Efficiencies

Turning from the dusty records of past judicial proceedings, it remains to consider what light economic science can cast upon the prob-

lem of ascertaining efficiencies. Legal development often, and not always to its disadvantage, has followed advances in economics. Yet, as
suggested earlier, the legal process places a severe constraint on the use
of economic analysis: The analysis must be capable of reduction into a
comparatively simple, two-valued rule. The legal rule must pronounce
that "substantial efficiencies" are either present or that they are not.
Unfortunately, my brief review of the economics of efficiency determination has not led to the discovery of an economic test that is capable
of reduction to the simple scope of a workable legal rule which will be
dispositive of the efficiencies issue. Perhaps I should make a little more
explicit my reading of the economic literature. First, I find a fairly general agreement that plant economies are exhausted at relatively small
scale. The situation is less clear as to firm economies, both in terms of
their existence and their social desirability.26 Second, while there are various tests for ascertaining economies, both plant and firm, none is really
suitable for judicial use. The test that comes closest as suitable for a
judicial proceeding is the survivor test, under which minimum efficient
scale firm is determined by observing the minimum size firm within a
defined market that has been able to survive and grow. However, the literature advises that in the view of some economists, at least, there are
serious problems with this test, for example, it sometimes leads to seemingly bizarre results as when the smallest and largest firms "survive."27
The other tests for efficiencies, engineering, statistical, and profit, are
each more complex than the survivor test, entailing difficult and highly
debatable engineering and accounting judgments. Application of any
one of the tests could increase the complexity of a legal proceeding by
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one or more orders of magnitude. Yet, the best results are obtained, I
gather, when not one but several tests for efficiency are employed together. As if all this were not enough, there are both static and dynamic
efficiencies to be considered. There is X-efficiency, learning effects efficiency, and research and innovative efficiencies (although some of these
concepts are perhaps already incorporated in the standard tests).28
I conclude that the economic tests are not suitable singly or in a
group for blanket incorporation into the deconcentration statute, but
properly hedged and restricted, as outlined below, may provide some
guidance.

Alternative Legal Approaches to Efficiencies

Chastened by the limited guidance that is to be drawn from past legal
history and economic science, it is my task now to suggest how the issue
of economic efficiencies feasibly can be managed in a deconcentration
proceeding. There seem to be four possible approaches: (1) Strike the
defense from the proposed statute; (2) sustain the defense where there is
proof of any significant efficiency loss; (3) sustain the defense only when
the efficiency loss is not outweighed by the competitive gain; and (4)
sustain the defense, as the proposed bill now would do, only where the
efficiency loss is serious or substantial.

The second and third possibilities can be eliminated quickly. To permit the defense on proof of any significant efficiency loss would make

the act a dead letter. As experience under the Public Utility Holding
Company Act shows, it was a poor management that could not point to
some kind of efficiency loss in the separation of even the most isolated
utility system.

To require, as would the third possibility, a weighing of efficiency
loss as against competitive gain is to compare the obscure with the

inscrutible. This was amply demonstrated in the instance of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act where such consideration was sometimes
attempted. It simply was not done in any rational manner, and it could
not be done. The same inability to measure the future competitive
impact of new organizational entities caused courts over a decade ago
wisely to remove from merger litigation any assessment of the future
competitive effects of a merger-a key step in the success of that law.
We must take the first possibility much more seriously. If we, as
Frank Kottke recently has urged,29 drop the efficiencies defense from the
proposed statute, no other single step would do as much to make the act

administratively feasible. Nevertheless, this alternative also must be rejected, for two reasons. First, the cost of making the bill legally feasible
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in this manner would destroy its political feasibility. It would be pointed

out that abuses of economic power already are sanctioned under the
antitrust laws, including Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Thus, the neces-

sary thrust of the industrial reorganization bill would be against the
existence of power unaccompanied by abuse and without regard to possible consumer detriment. The symbol of economic power does not suffi-

ciently arouse the public mind for such a step. After all, serious concern

about the powers of the so-called Imperial Presidency only developed

after the worst abuses in the history of the Republic. In the Public Utility Holding Company Act, passed in response to a record of flagrant
abuse by holding companies, it was still found necessary to include an
efficiencies defense. Perhaps the situation has been best summarized by

the British author A.D. Neale, who observed that Americans have a

tendency "to take a romantic view of the achievements and efficiency of
large industrial organizations even while they take a suspicious view of

their power."30 An efficiencies defense nicely responds to that bifurcation.
The second reason for not removing the efficiencies defense is the risk

that there would be a serious loss in investment values following the
passage of the act without such a defense. Investors in concentrated in-

dustries in effect would be told that the companies in which they were
invested would be broken up regardless of cost. Presumably they made

their investments because they believed these firms to be superior in
some sense. Many are apt to believe, correctly or incorrectly, that such
superiority rested at least in part on market size. A law which proceeded
in complete disregard of that factor could seriously undermine investor

confidence and hence the value of holdings.

Thus, I conclude that an efficiencies defense very much along the
lines of the language now in the proposed statute is necessary. It re-

mains to suggest how it can be implemented in a way that is legally
feasible.
Developing a Set of Constraints

I propose to approach the question of how to implement the efficien-

cies defense indirectly. Rather than attempt to develop outright a suggested procedure for determining efficiencies, I wish to ask whether it is
possible to first formulate a series of complaints which effectively would
limit and guide the efficiencies defense. I am impelled to this decision

because of the inconclusiveness of any effort to set forth the expected
costs and benefits of a deconcentration program. The only certain costs

are the transaction costs involved in the protracted proceedings, attorney
and expert economist fees, lost executive time, and reorganization costs.
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The only certain benefit is a reduction to some unspecified extent in centralized economic power. All else is shrouded in unascertained probabilities: the loss or increase in the value of output, the impact on business
incentive, and the redistribution of political power. In short, the net gain
or loss depends upon uncertain probability estimates multiplied by
highly subjective payoff values.

Let us turn from this inconclusive vector of forces to consider the im-

pact of deconcentration on those I would call the morally blameless
bystanders. These are persons who have made commitments based on

the existing scheme, but who are not responsible for it; they may be
shareholders, creditors, employees, geographic communities, and perhaps in some sense society as a whole in its reliance on private firms for
invention and innovation. Should not the rights of these bystanders impose a constraint on deconcentration policy? One response no doubt will

be that there are others, such as consumers, who are equally morally
blameless, who have been injured and will continue to be injured unless
centers of monopoly power are broken up; these others may in some
cases be poorer than the individuals I have referred to. While I concede
the persuasiveness of the argument, I deny its implication.
There is a deep-seated policy in our law favoring the protection of
vested rights. Such a policy could be said to perpetuate injustice since
many vested rights have a tainted foundation. Yet the theory of such
protection is that it gives a security to the structure of society's entitle-

ments, which enhance the welfare of all, since without such security no
one could be sure that the entitlements he enjoys today would be secure
tomorrow. Orderly planning and enjoyment of what one has would be

impossible, as all constantly would be in jeopardy.
If you have agreed thus far, you still may ask: But are the groups

enumerated morally blameless, particularly shareholders? Are they not
the beneficiaries of monopoly power? I shall argue that for the most part
they are not. Given the typical, long sustained oligopoly condition, most

of the shareholders, creditors, and employees will have made their commitments long after market power was acquired. As a result, their return
on their investment or job is apt to be no greater than those who have
committed to more competitive industries. Thus, they not only have no
responsibility for the concentrated market condition, but also are not

even benefiting from it. They are esentially in the same position as those
who have committed to more competitive sectors.

This is not to defeat the idea of deconcentration, but to place a constraint upon how it is to be accomplished. Consideration of the rights of

morally innocent bystanders can be accomplished by imposing on the
industrial deconcentration program several constraints. (1) The total ef-
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fect of deconcentration should impose no confiscatory loss on investors
(shareholders or creditors). (2) The immediate effect should impose no
severe fluctuation in values for investors. (3) No serious innovative loss

should be inflicted. (4) No severe loss of employment should result. (5)
No severe disruptions should be caused to geographic communities.
The relation of the efficiencies defense to these constraints is clear. A
severe loss of efficiencies is apt to impose some or all of the losses enumerated above. And the losses would be no less because they stemmed
from impairment of firm efficiencies rather than plant efficiencies, hence
both types of efficiencies should be recognized. The constraints also
have implications for the type of relief to be imposed. Radical surgery,
such as the closing on short notice of plants or units, could severely disrupt smaller communities and employment. It also could cause large
fluctuations in securities values, which would become permanent losses
for those who must surrender their commitments during the short
period.

The thrust of all of this is toward gradualism in adjudging relief and
toward voluntarily conceived plans. These considerations frequently will
militate in favor of relief centered on lowering of entry barriers, aimed
at achieving deconcentration over a longer time frame. Yet immediate
and direct divestiture is not by any means ruled out.
Formulating a Specific Approach

With these constraints in mind and in light of the legal history and
economic views discussed, is it now possible to consider a more specific
approach to the handling of the efficiencies defense? Essentially I shall
suggest a three-stage procedure.

Step 1 would be to designate what I shall call a dissolution target.
This would consist of the minimum deconcentration necessary to
achieve a market structure that is workably competitive. Definitions as
to what is workably competitive no doubt will vary, but I would define
this as a market structure free of highly concentrated oligopoly and in
which there are several innovative centers. A typical dissolution target
might be a minimum of twelve firms in the market, with no firm larger
than 10 percent. This is to be contrasted with the language in the
present bill, which calls on the commission to determine "the maximum
feasible number of competitors ... without the loss of substantial
economies." Such a determination would become redundant under the
appro4ch I am suggesting, for it would point to more deconcentration
than would be required.

Stage 2 would involve the tentative confirmation of the dissolution
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target by utilizing the only economic test which is at all amenable to
simple application, the survivor test. Under this test the dissolution target would be confirmed if firms of the proposed deconcentrated scale
have been able to survive and grow in the market. If there is insufficient
experience or data in the domestic market, recourse might be made to
foreign markets in competition with U.S. markets. Confirmation of the

dissolution target by the survivor test would lead to a strong presumption that deconcentration would entail no loss of substantial economies.
In the third stage, defendants would be given the opportunity by any
means they think appropriate to prove loss of substantial economies.
Here the demanding qualitative standard on proof of efficiencies im-

posed by the SEC under the Public Utilities Holding Company Act is
worthy of some emulation; thus, the insistence on thoroughly grounded
projections by independent experts is a sound requirement. On the other
hand, care must be taken not to go so far as did the SEC in undermining the efficiencies defense, for that would defeat the suggested constraints and their underlying values. To prevent this and to ensure that
the defense retains substance, it would be desirable to establish, by
statute or by guideline, a definite numerical measure of what constitutes
substantial economies. Tentatively, I would suggest the figures of a 5
percent or greater increase in total costs, or a 25 percent reduction in

net profit after taxes, either of which would be sufficient to sustain the
defense.

I would fully expect that this standard might be met and the defense
sustained in some cases, particularly given the slippage in the litigation
machinery. But I would not fret over this; indeed, in some ways I would
welcome it. For it would serve to reassure the public that real economies
were not being sacrificed in the deconcentration program, and I would
hope that this would help to steady investment values in those deconcentrations that were ordered.

Moreover, and this point bears emphasis, the sustaining of an
economies defense would not terminate the deconcentration proceeding.
On the contrary, it might help pave the way for the alternative remedy,
the lowering of entry barriers, for the efficiencies defense will require the

firm to demonstrate with some precision the particular efficiencies or
methods that enable it to enjoy lower costs or higher profits. Such a
demonstration may provide precisely the information the commission
needs to determine the relief necessary to lower entry barriers. Entry
barrier relief necessarily will be slower than divestiture, but that very
gradualness is exactly what is desired under the criteria I have urged,
when substantial economies are involved.

Certain procedural devices would be desirable to shorten and simplify

This content downloaded from 156.56.168.2 on Tue, 24 May 2016 18:40:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

378 Joseph F. Brodley

the complex proceeding that an efficiencies defense, whatever its form,
entails. Such devices, many of which have been used in past protracted
litigations, might include filing in advance of the hearing all direct testimony in narrative form and exhibits, exchanging objections to testimony
and exhibits and rulings thereon in advance of the hearing, confining the
actual hearing to cross examination, greater use of court-appointed witnesses, and possibly the use of expert masters to determine technical
questions of engineering and cost accounting.
Conclusion

The industrial reorganization bill can be made legally feasible. Some
of its decisional complexity can be removed without injury to its basic
object, the limitation of economic power. The difficult issue of efficien-

cies remains, but a legally feasible way of handling this issue seems pos-

sible. According fair recognition to the defense and avoiding the
stringency that was imposed on the similar defense in the administration

of the Public Utility Holding Company Act are apt to bar some divestitures, but in those cases relief could then proceed by the more gradual
method of removing entry barriers. Even in those instances where no effective relief at all results, there is value in the proceedings, for they require concentrated economic power to account for its stewardship and to
demonstrate that the continuance of such power serves the public interest. At least once in a generation that is a healthy posture for those who
hold great power, economic or any other kind.

Of course, there are risks, and these have been expressed with determination by a distinguished spokesman: "The drafters of this bill are
self-proclaimed disciples of the social theory that American corporations

are too large, and consequently their operations should be divided into
small pieces.... Suffice to say ... that ... the application of such a theory to American business in whole or in part will result in a financial
and economic chaos compared to which the present economic condition
will look like prosperity."' 1 Perhaps such fears are exaggerated, for that

was a speech delivered by Wendell Wilkie in opposition to the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.
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